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DECOMPOSING THE EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE FRAMING
IN LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
CALEB A. COX*
ABSTRACT. I examine two dimensions of framing in public goods games: Contributing vs. Taking
and Gains vs. Losses. I find decreased cooperation under the Taking frame, but not under the Loss
frame. This framing effect is stronger for men than women.
Keywords: Public goods, experiments, framing, gender differences
JEL Classification: C72, H41
1 INTRODUCTION
Cooperation in social dilemmas is of great interest to social scientists, in part because several
types of public goods problems and externalities can be represented with a similar structure.
Public goods may generate gains or prevent losses, and externalities may be positive or negative.
In many cases, these diverse economic problems can be represented using a simple linear public
goods game.
However, even strategically equivalent economic problems may differ along important framing
dimensions. In this paper, I present an experiment comparing results from a linear public goods
game in four framing conditions. The baseline condition involves contributing to generate gains
for the group (CG). I compare this baseline with framing conditions involving contributing to
prevent losses (CL), taking to prevent gains (TG), and taking to generates losses (TL). These
conditions are constructed to be strategically equivalent so that differences in behavior can be
attributed to framing.
A closely-related study by Andreoni (1995) compares a positive frame and a negative frame
(similar to CG and TL respectively), finding lower cooperation and higher rates of free-riding in
the negative frame. Andreoni concludes that the “warm glow” of benefiting others is stronger
than the “cold prickle” of hurting others. This result is replicated by Park (2000). However, these
studies do not distinguish between the contributing/taking dimension and the gain/loss dimension
of framing, either of which might drive these results. I decompose these framing dimensions to
identify their effects seperately.
Brandts and Schwieren (2009) compare framing conditions similar to the CG, TG, and TL con-
ditions, finding a small difference between CG and TL and no difference between TG and TL.
Unlike Andreoni, they vary group size, private return, and public return across rounds and give
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2no feedback, making their results difficult to compare. Moreover, Sonnemans et al. (1998) suggest
that framing effects may be more pronounced with repetition and feedback.
Other studies of framing in public goods games have shown mixed results. Some studies find
higher cooperation in the Contributing frame than in the Taking frame (e.g. Allison and Messick,
1985; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Khadjavi and Lange, forthcoming), while others find little differ-
ence (e.g. Fleishman, 1988; Cubitt et al., 2011; Cox et al., 2013; Stoddard, 2014; Fosgaard et al.,
forthcoming). Some studies find the opposite (e.g. Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Brown, 2006).
Fujimoto and Park (2010) find Andreoni’s negative frame has a larger effect on cooperation for
men than women in a one-shot experiment. Such gender differences might partly explain the
mixed results in the literature. While my experiment is not designed specifically to study gender
differences, as a secondary point I explore whether the gender differences found by Fujimoto and
Park persist over multiple rounds and extend to free-riding behavior.
The results show lower cooperation and higher free-riding in the Taking frame. Loss framing
has weaker effects. Moreover, I find that framing effects on cooperation are driven almost entirely
by men. Nonetheless, both men and women free-ride more frequently under Taking than under
Contributing.
2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
Like Andreoni (1995), each session had twenty subjects, randomly and anonymously assigned to
groups of five at the beginning of each of ten rounds. Subjects were given aggregate-level feedback
on their group members’ choices after each round. Subjects were paid for one random round.1
Table 1 summarizes the four treatments. In every treatment, each player can transfer 0 to
1000 tokens, worth $0.01 each. Each token transferred to (from) the group account increases
(decreases) the group account balance by 2.5 tokens. Each player receives her final private account
balance and receives (pays) an equal share of the positive (negative) group account balance. It is
straightforward to verify that the four payoff functions are equivalent.
Nine sessions were run (2 CG, 2 CL, 2 TG, and 3 TL) with 180 total participants. All sessions
were run at The Ohio State University using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted about 45
minutes, and subjects earned about $15 per person.
Initial Account Balances (tokens)
Treatment Private Group Transfers
CG 1000 0 Private to Group
CL 3500 -12500 Private to Group
TG 0 12500 Group to Private
TL 2500 0 Group to Private
Table 1. Treatment Summary
1Andreoni (1995) payed subjects for all rounds. Azrieli et al. (2014) show that paying for one random round avoids
potential confounds such as wealth effects.
3All Subjects Men Women
feedback 0.048* 0.028 0.076***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.027)
round -19.478*** -37.715*** 0.923
(5.025) (8.680) (4.078)
TG -283.694*** -449.165*** -69.905
(104.001) (137.998) (157.242)
CL -95.364 -69.314 -75.631
(84.515) (137.490) (98.742)
TL -184.894** -251.118* -105.709
(86.567) (129.586) (101.187)
constant 447.605*** 679.248*** 168.428
(83.970) (124.915) (96.133)
Table 2. Tobit regressions for cooperation. The omitted treatment indicator is CG. Standard errors
clustered by subject in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance.
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Figure 1. Average cooperation.
3 RESULTS
Figure 1 shows average cooperation by round for each treatment for all subjects and seperately by
gender.2 Cooperation is defined as the amount transferred to the group account in Contributing
frames (CG and CL) or 1000 minus the amount transferred from the group account in Taking
frames (TG and TL). To formally test for treatment differences, I use Tobit regressions reported
in Table 2.3 Cooperation is significantly lower in Taking frames than in Contributing frames for
2Overall, 41.7% of subjects in the experiment were women. By treatment, the percentages of women were: 42.5%
(CG), 35.0% (TG), 52.5% (CL), and 38.3% (TL).
3As subjects are randomly re-matched into groups in each round, feedback may create dependence between individ-
uals in a session (see Fréchette, 2012). As a control for such effects, I include in each regression model a lagged
“feedback” variable equal to the aggregate cooperation by others in the previous round. Regressions have also been
run including a 2-period lagged feedback variable, and using the average cooperation by other players across all
4All Subjects Men Women
feedback 0.9998* 0.9999 0.9997*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
round 1.0813*** 1.1401*** 0.9885
(0.0219) (0.0309) (0.0285)
TG 6.4134*** 6.1626*** 6.9790**
(3.0265) (3.2888) (6.3201)
CL 1.6115 2.3334 1.0221
(0.7535) (1.2877) (0.8698)
TL 4.5866*** 4.5270*** 4.6360*
(2.0482) (2.3087) (3.9821)
Table 3. Logistic regressions for free-riding. The omitted treatment indicator is CG. Odds ratios
shown with standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and
10% level significance.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
All Subjects
PG
NL
PL
NG
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Men
PG
NL
PL
NG
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Women
PG
NL
PL
NG
round
fre
e-
rid
in
g 
ra
te
Figure 2. Free-riding rates.
Gains. Loss framing does not show such a clear effect. However, examining men and women
seperately, the framing effect appears to be driven entirely by men. Furthermore, there appear
to be gender differences in dynamics: in all four treatments, men’s average cooperation trends
downward, while women’s cooperation is relatively flat.
Framing also affects free-riding rates. Figure 2 shows free-riding rates by round. Table 3 shows
logistic regression results for treatment effects on rates of choosing the free-riding dominant strat-
egy. Take framing increases free-riding for men and women.
4 DISCUSSION
This paper contributes to the previous literature by clearly decomposing the framing effects of
Contributing vs. Taking and Gains vs. Losses and showing that the former is more important in
previous rounds, but the results remain similar in both cases. Another approach suggested in Fréchette (2012) is to
cluster standard errors at the session level. This approach yields similar results.
5this environment. The Taking frame reduces average cooperation and increases free-riding. Loss
framing has weaker effects.
As a secondary contribution, I show persistent gender differences in framing effects. Take
framing has a strong effect on average cooperation for men, but not for women. While it is dif-
ficult to explain the underlying causes of such gender differences, one possible conjecture is that
Take framing primes competitive norms which are more salient for men. However, Take framing
increases free-riding rates for both genders. In all frames, men’s cooperation falls over multiple
rounds, while women’s does not. I am not aware of previous studies finding this result, and it may
merit further study in future research.
Gender differences in framing effects might help to explain the mixed results in the previous
literature. While differences in procedures, and differing statistical power, or other uncontrolled
variables may also lead to differing results, differences in gender composition could be part of the
explanation. However, gender is not the focus of my experimental design, and further study is
needed to determine whether these gender differences are robust.
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